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ARTICLES
RE-EVALUATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY: THE DOJ’S INTERNAL MORAL
CULPABILITY STANDARD FOR CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Lucian E. Dervan*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1909, the scope of American criminal jurisprudence was
forever changed by the creation of corporate criminal liability in
the landmark decision New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States.1 New York Central, however, was only
the beginning of corporate criminal liability’s evolution. Over the
next one hundred years, numerous appellate courts interpreted
the Supreme Court’s conclusion that a corporation could not be
immune from ‚all punishment because of the old and exploded
doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime‛2 to create a
plethora of precedent establishing an exceedingly low bar for liability.3
* © 2011, Lucian E. Dervan. All rights reserved. Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. J.D., with high honors, Emory University School of
Law, 2002; B.A., cum laude, Davidson College, 1998. Order of the Coif; former law clerk to
the Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit; former member of the King & Spalding LLP Special Matters and Government
Investigations Team. Special thanks to Professors Ellen Podgor, Joan Heminway, and
Andrew Taslitz for selecting my Article for inclusion in the 2010 Southeastern Association
of Law Schools’ roundtable discussion on ‚Re-evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability.‛
Thanks also to all of the other participants in the roundtable from whom I learned a great
deal.
1. 212 U.S. 481 (1909); see Jerold H. Israel, Ellen S. Podgor, Paul D. Borman & Peter
J. Henning, White Collar Crime: Law and Practice 53 (3d ed., West 2009) (discussing the
history of corporate criminal liability).
2. N.Y. Central, 212 U.S. at 495–496.
3. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of Corporations, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1363 (2009) (observing that after N.Y. Central, courts
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Currently, corporate criminal liability attaches upon a meager showing of respondeat superior, a tort concept only requiring
that an employee’s or agent’s actions (a) are within the scope of
his or her duties and (b) are intended, even if only in part, to benefit the corporation.4 The standard is so de minimis that it allows
a corporation to be held criminally liable even if (a) the criminal
behavior was perpetrated by a low-level, rogue employee without
upper-level management’s knowledge; (b) the perpetrator was
explicitly instructed by the corporation not to engage in the conduct and was directly violating established company policy; and
(c) the company had an established and effective compliance program in place at the time of the offense and the conduct came to
light because of such compliance program.5
As might be expected from the description above, the twoprong approach to corporate criminal liability has engendered
great disfavor among various groups, most notably academics and
the criminal-defense bar. Both argue in part that the standard is
too easily satisfied.6 As one commentator remarked, ‚[T]he criminal case against a corporation, once there is evidence that even a
frequently imposed corporate criminal liability despite the legislature’s silence on the
issue).
4. See In re Hellenic, Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001) (‚An agent’s knowledge is
imputed to the corporation [when] the agent is acting within the scope of his authority and
[when] the knowledge relates to matters within the scope of that authority.‛ (footnote
omitted)); United States v. 7326 Hwy. 45 N., 965 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1992) (‚[A]cting
within the scope of employment means ‘with intent to benefit the employer.’‛ (citations
omitted)); Memo. from Paul J. McNulty, Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Heads of
Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 2 (2006) (available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf)
(‚Corporations are ‘legal persons,’ capable of suing and being sued, and capable of committing crimes. . . . To hold a corporation liable for these actions, the government must
establish that the corporate agent’s actions ([i]) were within the scope of his duties and (ii)
were intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.‛); Dane C. Ball & Daniel E.
Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial Abuse in the Corporate Criminal Charging
Decision, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. 229, 234 (2009) (stating that ‚if a criminal act benefits only the
employee, officer, or director, vicarious liability does not apply‛ (footnote omitted)).
5. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul:
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 53, 64–
65 (2007) (describing situations in which a corporation is criminally liable); Pamela H.
Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense? 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1437,
1441 (2009) (observing situations in which a corporation may be held criminally liable
despite best efforts to prevent wrongdoing and in the absence of any benefit to the corporation).
6. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1096 (1991) (noting that commentators are skeptical
of using criminal prosecution to punish corporations).
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single low-level employee engaged in criminal activity on the job,
is virtually bulletproof.‛7 Another has written, ‚Prosecutors have
inordinate leverage due to the current application of the doctrine
of vicarious liability. A single low-level employee’s criminal conduct can be sufficient to trigger criminal liability on the part of
the corporation.‛8
But what is at the heart of this discomfort and unease with
the current standard? Certainly there are other aspects of criminal law that assist the prosecution in its task and lower the
applicable threshold for conviction. Examples include conspiracy
law and strict-liability offenses.9 Perhaps then it is not the ease
with which the respondeat superior standard may be met, but
rather that the test, borrowed directly from tort law, wholly
ignores a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence present in
crimes applicable to individuals: moral culpability.10
II. MORAL CULPABILITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
DESERVING PUNISHMENT
For individuals, there are two fundamental requirements for
criminal liability. First, the individual must engage in conduct
that creates moral culpability, which means it is conduct ‚deserving of punishment.‛11 Second, the morally culpable conduct must
7. Bharara, supra n. 5, at 76.
8. Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1319, 1320 (2007).
9. Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34
Ariz. L. Rev. 743, 747 (1992) (explaining that ‚[a]s the proliferation of strict[-]liability
offenses attests, the principle of responsibility is not absolute, and some commentators see
the growth of strict liability as a repudiation of the traditional link between culpability
and punishment‛ (footnote omitted)); Herbert Wechsler, William Kenneth Jones & Harold
L. Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 957, 959–960 (1961)
(describing the prosecutorial advantages of a conspiracy charge).
10. See Bharara, supra n. 5, at 63 (noting that ‚there has been even some judicial
recognition that corporate criminal law wears the garment of vicarious liability somewhat
like an ill-fitting hand-me-down, but significantly, courts have accepted the tradeoffs
between legal coherence and crime prevention‛); Bucy, supra n. 6, at 1114–1115 (discussing N.Y. Central’s flaw of failing to appreciate the inherently different nature of civil and
criminal law).
11. John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1329, 1330 (2009); William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler,
Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1285, 1289 (2000).
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have been made criminal.12 With regard to corporate criminality,
the second tenet is arguably satisfied by the respondeat superior
standard. The conduct that has been made criminal is any situation in which a corporation’s employee or agent engages in
criminal conduct within the scope of his or her duties and with
the intent to benefit the corporation. The first tenet, however, is
wholly ignored, and the current standard allows conviction of corporations when the entity has engaged in no morally culpable
behavior.13 As an example, consider the moral distinction between
a corporation whose board of directors encourages employees to
engage in illegal behavior and a corporation that, through utilizing an effective compliance program, discovers and punishes a
rogue employee who acted against direct corporate and managerial instructions to the contrary. Should each of these corporations be viewed as equally guilty under the law? Just as one
would feel great discomfort if an individual were convicted of
engaging in conduct that did not deserve punishment, there is a
sense of great unease when corporations suffer this precise fate.
It is at this point in the analysis of corporate criminal liability
when some commentators argue that corporations should simply
not be subject to criminal liability because they, as fictitious entities, cannot be morally culpable.14 This premise should be
rejected, however, because corporations act as persons under the
law and must be treated accordingly.15 Further, it is vital to society that entities as powerful as corporations be accountable for
their actions in both the civil and criminal arenas.16 Therefore, to
12. See Bharara, supra n. 5, at 57 (explaining that a corporation is criminally liable
only for the illegal acts of an employee).
13. See Matt Senko, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements,
19 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 163, 184 (2009) (arguing that ‚[t]he abrogation of the intent
requirement for corporate defendants destabilizes the essential framework of criminal
justice by punishing those who have no subjective culpability‛).
14. See Bucy, supra n. 5, at 1440 (discussing the reasons why some argue corporations,
as fictional entities, should not be prosecuted); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of
Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 473, 475 (2006) (explaining that academics have
criticized corporate criminal liability because of ‚the impossibility of fitting liberal concepts
about responsibility with nonhuman actors‛).
15. See e.g. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (‚In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress
. . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations . . . .‛).
16. See Bucy, supra n. 5, at 1437 (stating that corporations should be prosecuted
because they ‚often engage in activity that harms lots of people‛); see generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron’s Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions, 71
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1167 (2003) (discussing the effects of the Enron affair).
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alleviate the discomfort surrounding current corporate criminal
liability, a moral culpability element must be added to the existing two-prong respondeat superior standard.17 But how does one
establish whether a corporation’s actions have satisfied a moral
culpability element?
Pamela Bucy addressed just this issue in her 1991 article
entitled Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability.18 In her article, Bucy argued that corporations
have distinct and identifiable personalities or ‚ethos,‛ and that
only organizations with ethos that encouraged employees or
agents to commit criminal acts should be held criminally accountable under the law.19 Interestingly, Bucy advanced the following
eight factors for consideration in determining whether a corporate
ethos encouraged criminal conduct:
(1)

Was the corporation organized in a manner that
encouraged the criminal conduct?

(2)

Were goals set by the corporation that encouraged
illegal behavior?

(3)

Were corporate
requirements?

(4)

Were legal requirements monitored?

(5)

Who was involved in the criminal conduct, and was it
‚recklessly tolerated‛ by higher echelon officials?

(6)

How did the corporation react to past violations of the
law and individual violators?

(7)

Were there compensation incentives for legally inappropriate behavior?

employees

educated

about

legal

17. Amendments to the common law test for vicarious liability could be achieved
either through judicial or legislative action.
18. Bucy, supra n. 6, at 1099. Though Bucy described her proposed theory as addressing a lack of ‚intent‛ in the respondeat superior standard, for ease of discussion this
Article will examine her proposal as one that can be generically described as a culpability
element.
19. Id.
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Are there indemnification practices that encourage
criminal conduct?20

Bucy proposed that corporate criminal liability should attach if
these factors indicate that the corporate ethos encouraged the
employee’s or agent’s criminal conduct.21
III. MORAL CULPABILITY AND THE DOJ’S PRINCIPLES OF
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
Though today’s Department of Justice would likely challenge
Bucy’s proposed modification of the respondeat superior test, it
cannot deny that moral culpability should at least be considered
before criminal charges are levied against a corporate defendant.
This is because, although Bucy’s culpability factors have not been
incorporated into the common law, the Department of Justice has
essentially mimicked this moral culpability analysis in its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(‚Principles of Prosecution‛).22
The Principles of Prosecution, which was first issued by then
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder on June 16, 1999, listed
eight factors for consideration before criminally charging a corporation.23 The memorandum has undergone several iterations since
its initial release, but the basic structure of the nine core principles have remained the same.24 The factors for consideration by
the Department of Justice are:

20. Id. at 1129–1146.
21. Id. at 1128.
22. See Laufer & Strudler, supra n. 11, at 1303 (noting that ‚throughout the [federal
prosecutorial guidelines], prosecutors are cautioned about resorting to vicarious liability
[if] it would be unfairly strict to the ‘corporate person’‛).
23. Memo. from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Heads of
Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Bringing Criminal Charges against Corporations 3
(June 16, 1999) (available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/
1999/charging-corps.PDF). The memorandum from Holder was later amended by Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson, who changed the title to Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. Memo. from Larry D. Thompson, Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Just., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 1 (Jan. 20, 2003) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm).
24. Memo. from Larry D. Thompson, supra n. 23, at 3; Memo. from Paul J. McNulty,
supra n. 4, at 4.

File: Dervan C5(b)

2011]

Created on: 10/26/2011 12:29:00 PM

Last Printed: 11/12/2011 2:15:00 PM

Re-Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability
1.

the nature and seriousness of the offense, including
the risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies
and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for particular categories of crime;

2.

the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity in, or condonation of, the
wrongdoing by corporate management;

3.

the corporation’s history of similar conduct, including
prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement
actions against it;

4.

the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents;

5.

the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s preexisting compliance program;

6.

the corporation’s remedial actions, including any
efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance
program or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with
the relevant government agencies;

7.

collateral consequences, including disproportionate
harm to shareholders, pension holders and employees
not proven personally culpable and impact on the public arising from the prosecution;

8.

the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and

9.

the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions.25

13

These Department of Justice principles and the Bucy culpability factors are strikingly similar. Perhaps this explains the
great divide between a dissatisfied academy and defense bar and
a seemingly content law-enforcement body. The Department of
Justice is not concerned with the lack of moral culpability in the
common law corporate criminal liability standard because it has
25. Memo. from Paul J. McNulty, supra n. 4, at 4 (internal cross-references omitted)
(emphasis in original).
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implemented a moral culpability element on its own and requires
that it be considered before bringing any criminal charges.26
Maybe corporations should be satisfied that despite the reluctance of the courts to revise the standard established in New York
Central over one hundred years ago to incorporate a moral culpability element, the Department of Justice has seen fit to
implement a new standard on its own volition. There are,
however, two fundamental flaws with allowing the status quo to
suffice.
First, while the government’s consideration of the Principles
of Prosecution may be ‚mandatory,‛ these guidelines create no
legal rights for corporate defendants.27 In fact, since the Principles
of Prosecution is technically found within the United States Attorneys’ Manual, the following disclaimer contained in the
introduction applies to any attempt to enforce this additional
moral culpability element to the basic respondeat superior standard:
The Manual provides only internal Department of Justice
guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed on otherwise
lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice. 28

While the Department of Justice’s actions to incorporate consideration of moral culpability should be applauded, moral
culpability should be a fundamental aspect of the common law
test rather than an unenforceable aspiration on the part of the
prosecuting entity. Furthermore, because the Principles of Prosecution is an internal departmental document, the Department of
Justice retains the ability to amend it at any given point, including in ways that are viewed as inappropriate or even
26. See Laufer & Strudler, supra n. 11, at 1305 (recognizing that the federal prosecutorial guidelines reflect prosecutors’ abandonment of traditional vicarious liability rules in
favor of new set of rules focusing on moral culpability).
27. Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice”, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 167, 170 (2004).
28. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 1-1.100 (updated May
2009) (available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/1mdoj
.htm).
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constitutionally offensive.29 If, as even the Department of Justice
appears to agree, moral culpability should be considered before
attaching criminal liability to a corporation, moral culpability
must become an established and legally binding element of the
applicable standard.
Second, the Principles of Prosecution suffers from a flaw that
is also found within the Bucy culpability factors for establishing
corporate criminal liability. Each contains elements for consideration that are outside the applicable scope of inquiry because they
examine actions by the corporation that occur after the criminal
conduct under scrutiny. Focusing on the Principles of Prosecution,
the nine factors may be sorted into the following distinct categories:
PRE-OFFENSE OR OFFENSE-SPECIFIC CONDUCT


Nature and Seriousness of the Offense



Pervasiveness of the Wrongdoing



Corporation’s Past History



Existence and Adequacy of the Pre-Existing Compliance
Program

POST-OFFENSE CONDUCT


Timely and Voluntary Disclosure



Remedial Actions



Collateral Consequences of Prosecution



Adequacy of Civil or Regulatory Enforcement



Adequacy of Prosecution of Individuals

Contrary to the full criteria advanced by the Principles of
Prosecution, only those factors listed in the pre-offense or offensespecific conduct category are properly considered in determining
corporate moral culpability. This is because the actions taken by
the corporation after the discovery of wrongdoing do not offer reliable insight into the true ethos of the corporation at the time of
the underlying offense. For instance, a corporation that was not
29. See Podgor, supra n. 27, at 170 (emphasizing that the guidelines may be changed
at any time and are not subject to judicial review).
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morally culpable at the time a rogue employee committed a criminal act may later attempt to obstruct justice to prevent detection
of the conduct. While this might properly result in a corporate
conviction for obstruction of justice, the organization should not
also be held accountable for the previous acts of the employee.
Similarly, a corporation that was morally culpable for the acts of
its employee because it encouraged the illegality does not become
morally pure merely because it offers remedial amends once the
behavior is discovered. As such, focusing only on pre-offense and
offense-specific considerations creates a more reliable mechanism
for the culpability analysis.
Drawing on the four factors described above, an analysis of
whether a corporation encouraged the criminal behavior of its
employee or agent for purposes of the proposed moral culpability
element would include consideration of several questions. First,
what does the nature and seriousness of the offense tell us about
the corporate ethos? If the offense is minor, the individual may
have believed he or she would succeed undetected by the corporation. If, however, the offense is particularly egregious and far
reaching, it is more likely that the individual believed the conduct
would be permitted and his or her action would go unpunished
and unreported by the corporation. Second, was the conduct pervasive? The involvement of multiple employees, agents, or units of
the corporation likely signals a corporate ethos that encouraged,
or at least tolerated, legally questionable activity. Third, did the
corporation have a history of past bad acts, and what was the
response to such activities? If a corporation has an extensive history of employees and agents engaging in improprieties that go
unpunished, the corporation may be found to be encouraging,
even if only indirectly, further criminal conduct. If, however, the
corporation has a limited history of employee or agent misconduct
and any discovered misconduct is dealt with swiftly and severely,
the corporation is likely not engaged in wrongful conduct. Finally,
did the corporation have a pre-existing and effective compliance
program? Particularly in today’s enforcement environment, the
failure to have an effective compliance program sends a strong
message to employees and agents that enforcing legal obligations
is not a priority for the organization. Such a message indicates
the existence of a corporate ethos that encouraged the criminal
conduct at issue.
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To be clear, the remaining five post-offense conduct factors
from the Principles of Prosecution are not irrelevant because they
remain exceedingly important in determining whether an organization should—not may—be prosecuted. When the government is
determining whether an individual may be charged with fraud,
consideration of whether the victim has received restitution is not
a factor in the legal analysis of the elements of the offense.30 Such
remedial measures are considered, however, when the prosecution determines how it should exercise its prosecutorial discretion, a purely permissive undertaking.31 In a similar fashion,
instead of focusing on whether the legal elements of corporate
criminal liability have been satisfied, the analysis of post-offense
conduct by a corporation should be relegated to the government’s
permissive determination of whether to prosecute.32
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, the common law respondeat superior test for
corporate criminal liability should be expanded beyond the current two-prong test to encompass a third prong regarding moral
culpability. The revised test, which might be termed the moral
culpability standard, would permit corporate criminal liability as
described below:
A corporation shall be criminally liable for the criminal acts
of its employees or agents when:
(1)

The employee’s or agent’s criminal acts:
a.
b.

Were within the scope of their duties; and
Were intended to benefit the corporation;

And,

30. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (2006) (setting forth the elements the government
must prove to prosecute a person for committing fraud against the United States, which do
not include whether restitution has been made).
31. See Podgor, supra n. 27, at 168 (explaining that prosecutors have discretion
regarding ‚whether cases will be plea bargained, dismissed, or tried‛).
32. This does not mean that the government may not also consider the first four preoffense and offense-specific conduct factors in deciding whether it should prosecute.
Rather, this Article merely argues that the five post-conduct factors should not be part of
the proposed common law moral culpability analysis.
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The corporation is morally culpable for encouraging
the above-described criminal acts of its employees or
agents based on an analysis of the following four
factors:
a.
b.

c.

d.

The nature and seriousness of the offense,
including the risk of harm to the public;
The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within
the corporation, including the complicity
in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by
corporate management;
The corporation’s history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, and
regulatory enforcement actions against it;
and
The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program.

Such a revised standard increases the burden on the prosecution
to establish a criminal violation, incorporates a moral culpability
element into the traditional respondeat superior test, and focuses
the analysis of whether the corporation is morally culpable on a
refined and appropriately limited group of pre-offense and
offense-specific factors.
This proposal is but one of many currently being considered
as a remedy to the status quo, and the conclusion of this Article
will briefly discuss three such proposals and their relationship to
the moral culpability standard described above. The first is the
Model Penal Code, which proposes to limit corporate liability to
those instances in which ‚the commission of the offense was
authorized, requested, commanded, performed[,] or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent
acting [o]n behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office
or employment.‛33 The second is the standard advocated by Andrew Weissmann, who would permit corporate criminal liability
only if ‚a company reasonably should have taken steps to detect
and deter the criminal action of its employee.‛34 Finally, Ellen
33. Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (ALI proposed off. dft. 1962).
34. Weissmann, supra n. 8, at 1335; see also Andrew Weissmann & David Newman,
Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 411, 411 (2007) (arguing that ‚the
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Podgor has proposed creating an affirmative defense applicable to
any corporation that has taken all reasonable preventative steps
in the matter.35
While the intent of each of these proposals is commendable, a
more sweeping correction to the respondeat superior standard is
warranted, particularly given the increasing frequency with
which corporations are being criminally investigated. The moral
culpability proposal advanced in this Article incorporates elements of each of the three alternatives described above. A moral
culpability standard protects corporations when there was no
involvement by high managerial agents and prevents prosecution
of corporations that took all reasonable steps to detect and deter
criminal acts. Beyond the above alternatives, however, the moral
culpability standard also protects a corporation that may have
failed to satisfy one of these standards but that, after analysis of
the four factors, does not appear to have a corporate ethos that
encouraged the relevant criminal behavior. Finally, the moral
culpability test punishes a corporation that might satisfy one of
the above proposals but that has still demonstrated an ethos that
encouraged criminal behavior.
Corporate criminal liability is a unique legal concept that
presents complex and difficult quandaries because laws created
for humans are applied to fictitious entities. Nevertheless, criminal laws can and must be applied to corporations to ensure that
these organizations, which are growing in ever-increasing size
and strength, are held accountable for their actions. In extending
criminal liability to corporations, however, it is important to
remember that though they are fictitious, corporations are merely
collections of people who suffer real and significant consequences
when corporate criminal laws are applied.36 As such, every effort
must be made to ensure corporate criminal liability is applied to

government should bear the burden of establishing . . . that the corporation failed to have
reasonable policies and procedures to prevent the employee’s conduct‛).
35. Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative
Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537, 1538 (2007); see also Bucy, supra n. 5, at 1442 (proposing a ‚corporate compliance‛ affirmative defense to prevent prosecution of corporations
‚that have taken all reasonable steps to discourage illegal corporate acts and encourage
compliance of the law‛).
36. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 Stan. L.
Rev. 271, 277–280 (2008) (describing the collateral consequences of a corporate conviction).
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organizations in a fair and consistent manner, as if the corporations were the very people who fill their ranks.

